The Kerry-Lugar Bill: details and conditions

The following is the text of the Kerry-Lugar Bill passed by the Senate on Thursday, Sept 24, 2009. It will now go to the House of Representatives and if passed without amendments, will be sent to President Barack Obama for signing into law:

S.1707

Enhanced Partnership with Pakistan Act of 2009 (Engrossed as Agreed to or Passed by Senate)

SEC. 203. LIMITATIONS ON CERTAIN ASSISTANCE.

(a) Limitation on Security-related Assistance: For fiscal years 2011 through 2014, no security-related assistance may be provided to Pakistan in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(b) Limitation on Arms Transfers: For fiscal years 2012 through 2014, no letter of offer to sell major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC 2751 et seq.) and no license to export major defence equipment to Pakistan may be issued pursuant to such Act in a fiscal year until the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, makes the certification required under subsection (c) for such fiscal year.

(c) Certification: The certification required by this subsection is a certification by the Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, to the appropriate congressional committees that: (1) the Government of Pakistan is continuing to cooperate with the United States in efforts to dismantle supplier networks relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons-related materials, such as providing relevant information from or direct access to Pakistani nationals associated with such networks;

(2) the Government of Pakistan during the preceding fiscal year has demonstrated a sustained commitment to and is making significant efforts towards combating terrorist groups, consistent with the purposes of assistance described in section 201, including taking into account the extent to which the Government of Pakistan has made progress on matters such as (A) ceasing support, including by any elements within the Pakistan military or its intelligence agency, to extremist and terrorist groups, particularly to any group that has conducted attacks against the United States or coalition forces in Afghanistan, or against the territory or people of neighbouring countries; (B) preventing al-Qaeda, the Taliban and associated terrorist groups, such as Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed, from operating in the territory of Pakistan, including carrying out cross-border attacks into neighbouring countries, closing terrorist camps in the Fata, dismantling terrorist bases of operations in other parts of the country, including Quetta and Muridke, and taking action when provided with intelligence about high-level terrorist targets; and (C) strengthening counterterrorism and anti-money laundering laws; and (3) the security forces of Pakistan are not materially and substantially subverting the political or judicial processes of Pakistan.

(d) Certain Payments: (1) IN GENERAL- Subject to paragraph (2), none of the funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014, or any amounts appropriated to the Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), may be obligated or expended to make payments relating to (A) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-YAD signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; (B) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-NAP signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006; and C) the Letter of Offer and Acceptance PK-D-SAF signed between the Governments of the United States of America and Pakistan on September 30, 2006.

(2) EXCEPTION: Funds appropriated for security-related assistance for fiscal years 2010 through 2014 may be used for construction and related activities carried out pursuant to the Letters of Offer and Acceptance described in paragraph (1).

(e) Waiver: (1) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may waive the limitations contained in subsections (a), (b), and (d) for a fiscal year if the Secretary of State determines that is important to the national security interests of the United States to do so.

(2) PRIOR NOTICE OF WAIVER: The Secretary of State, under the direction of the President, may not exercise the authority of paragraph (1) until seven days after the Secretary of State provides to the appropriate congressional committees a written notice of the intent to issue to waiver and the reasons therefore. The notice may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(f) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Foreign Affairs, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Oversight and Government Reform, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Foreign Relations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

SEC. 204. PAKISTAN COUNTERINSURGENCY CAPABILITY FUND.

(a) For Fiscal Year 2010: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal year 2010, the Department of State’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Capability Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32), hereinafter in this section referred to as the `Fund’, shall consist of the following: (A) Amounts appropriated to carry out this subsection (which may not include any amounts appropriated to carry out title I of this Act).

(B) Amounts otherwise available to the Secretary of State to carry out this subsection.

(2) PURPOSES OF FUND: Amounts in the Fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year are authorised to be used by the Secretary of State, with the concurrence of the Secretary of Defence, to build and maintain the counterinsurgency capability of Pakistan under the same terms and conditions (except as otherwise provided in this subsection) that are applicable to amounts made available under the Fund for fiscal year 2009.

(3) TRANSFER AUTHORITY: (A) IN GENERAL - The Secretary of State is authorised to transfer amounts in the fund made available to carry out this subsection for any fiscal year to the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund established under the Supplemental Appropriations Act, 2009 (Public Law 111-32) and such amounts may be transferred back to the Fund if the Secretary of Defence, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State, determines that such amounts are not needed for the purposes for which initially transferred.

(B) TREATMENT OF TRANSFERRED FUNDS: Subject to subsections (d) and (e) of section 203, transfers from the Fund under the authority of subparagraph (A) shall be merged with and be available for the same purposes and for the same time period as amounts in the Department of Defence’s Pakistan Counterinsurgency Fund.

(C) RELATION TO OTHER AUTHORITIES: The authority to provide assistance under this subsection is in addition to any other authority to provide assistance to foreign countries.

(D) NOTIFICATION: The Secretary of State shall, not less than 15 days prior to making transfers from the Fund under subparagraph (A), notify the appropriate congressional committees in writing of the details of any such transfer.

(b) Submission of Notifications: Any notification required by this section may be submitted in classified or unclassified form, as necessary.

(c) Appropriate Congressional Committees Defined: In this section, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (1) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives; and (2) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, and the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate.

SEC. 205. REQUIREMENTS FOR CIVILIAN CONTROL OF CERTAIN ASSISTANCE

(a) Requirements: (1) IN GENERAL - For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, any direct cash security-related assistance or non-assistance payments by the United States to the Government of Pakistan may only be provided or made to civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan.

(2) DOCUMENTATION: For fiscal years 2010 through 2014, the Secretary of State, in coordination with the Secretary of Defence, shall ensure that civilian authorities of a civilian government of Pakistan have received a copy of final documentation provided to the United States related to non-assistance payments provided or made to the Government of Pakistan.

(b) Waiver: 1) SECURITY-RELATED ASSISTANCE: The Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defence, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to security-related assistance described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 150 (International Affairs) if the Secretary of State certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(2) NON-ASSISTANCE PAYMENTS: The Secretary of Defence, in consultation with the Secretary of State, may waive the requirements of subsection (a) with respect to non-assistance payments described in subsection (a) funded from accounts within budget function 050 (National Defence) if the Secretary of Defense certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that the waiver is important to the national security interest of the United States.

(c) Application to Certain Activities- Nothing in this section shall apply with respect to (1) any activities subject to reporting requirements under title V of the National Security Act of 1947 (50 U.S.C. 413 et seq.); (2) any assistance to promote democratic elections or public participation in democratic processes; (3) any assistance or payments if the Secretary of State determines and certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that subsequent to the termination of assistance or payments a democratically elected government has taken office; (4) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 1208 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375; 118 Stat. 2086), as amended; (5) any payments made pursuant to the Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement between the Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan; and (6) any assistance or payments made pursuant to section 943 of the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009 (Public Law 110-417; 122 Stat. 4578).

(d) Definitions- In this section (1) the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Affairs of the House of Representatives and the Committees on Appropriations, Armed Services, and Foreign Relations of the Senate; and (2) the term ‘civilian government of Pakistan’ does not include any government of Pakistan whose duly elected head of government is deposed by military coup or decree.

TITLE III—STRATEGY, ACCOUNTABILITY, MONITORING, AND OTHER PROVISIONS SEC. 301. STRATEGY REPORTS.

(a) Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report- Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report describing United States policy and strategy with respect to assistance to Pakistan under this Act. The report shall include the following: (1) A description of the principal objectives of United States assistance to Pakistan to be provided under title I of this Act.

(2) A general description of the specific programs, projects, and activities designed to achieve the purposes of section 101 and the respective funding levels for such programs, projects, and activities for fiscal years 2010 through 2014.

(3) A plan for program monitoring, operations research, and impact evaluation research for assistance authorized under title I of this Act.

(4) A description of the role to be played by Pakistani national, regional, and local officials and members of Pakistani civil society and local private sector, civic, religious, and tribal leaders in helping to identify and implement programs and projects for which assistance is to be provided under this Act, and of consultations with such representatives in developing the strategy.

(5) A description of the steps taken, or to be taken, to ensure assistance provided under this Act is not awarded to individuals or entities affiliated with terrorist organizations.

(6) A projection of the levels of assistance to be provided to Pakistan under this Act, broken down into the following categories as described in the annual `Report on the Criteria and Methodology for Determining the Eligibility of Candidate Countries for Millennium Challenge Account Assistance’: (A) Civil liberties. (B) Political rights. (C) Voice and accountability. (D) Government effectiveness. (E) Rule of law. (F) Control of corruption. (G) Immunization rates. (H) Public expenditure on health. (I) Girls’ primary education completion rate. (J) Public expenditure on primary education. (K) Natural resource management. (L) Business start-up. (M) Land rights and access. (N) Trade policy. (O) Regulatory quality. (P) Inflation control. (Q) Fiscal policy.

(7) An analysis for the suitable replacement for existing Pakistani helicopters, including recommendations for sustainment and training.

(b) Comprehensive Regional Strategy Report: (1) SENSE OF CONGRESS: It is the sense of Congress that the achievement of United States national security goals to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan requires the development of a comprehensive plan that utilizes all elements of national power, including in coordination and cooperation with other concerned governments, and that it is critical to Pakistan’s long-term prosperity and security to strengthen regional relationships among India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan.

(2) COMPREHENSIVE REGIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY: The President shall develop a comprehensive interagency regional security strategy to eliminate terrorist threats and close safe havens in Pakistan, including by working with the Government of Pakistan and other relevant governments and organizations in the region and elsewhere, as appropriate, to best implement effective counterinsurgency and counterterrorism efforts in and near the border areas of Pakistan and Afghanistan, including the FATA, the NWFP, parts of Balochistan, and parts of Punjab.

(3) REPORT: (A) IN GENERAL- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report on the comprehensive regional security strategy required under paragraph (2).

(B) CONTENTS- The report shall include a copy of the comprehensive regional security strategy, including specifications of goals, and proposed timelines and budgets for implementation of the strategy.

(C) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES DEFINED: In this paragraph, the term `appropriate congressional committees’ means (i) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Affairs, and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives; and (ii) the Committee on Appropriations, the Committee on Armed Services, the Committee on Foreign Relations, and the Select Committee on Intelligence of the Senate.

(c) Security-related Assistance Plan- Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of State shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a plan for the proposed use of amounts authorized for security-related assistance for each of the fiscal years 2010 through 2014. Such plan shall include an assessment of how the use of such amounts complements or otherwise is related to amounts described in section 204.

SEC. 302. MONITORING REPORTS.

(a) Semi-Annual Monitoring Report- Not later than 180 days after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), and every 180 days thereafter through September 30, 2014, the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that describes the assistance provided under this Act during the preceding 180-day period. The report shall include—

(1) a description of all assistance by program, project, and activity, as well as by geographic area, provided pursuant to title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, including the amount of assistance provided for each program or project, and with respect to the first report a description of all amounts made available for assistance to Pakistan during fiscal year 2009, including a description of each program, project, and activity for which funds were made available; (2) a list of persons or entities from the United States or other countries that have received funds in excess of $100,000 to conduct projects under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report, which may be included in a classified annex, if necessary to avoid a security risk, and a justification for the classification; (3) with respect to the plan described in section 301(a)(3), updates to such plan and a description of best practices to improve the impact of the assistance authorized under title I of this Act; (4) an assessment of the effectiveness of assistance provided under title I of this Act during the period covered by the report in achieving desired objectives and outcomes as guided by the plan described in section 301(a)(3), and as updated pursuant to paragraph (3) of this subsection, including a systematic, qualitative, and where possible, quantitative basis for assessing whether desired outcomes are achieved and a timeline for completion of each project and program; (5) a description of any shortfall in United States financial, physical, technical, or human resources that hinder the effective use and monitoring of such funds; (6) a description of any negative impact, including the absorptive capacity of the region for which the resources are intended, of United States bilateral or multilateral assistance and recommendations for modification of funding, if any; (7) any incidents or reports of waste, fraud, and abuse of expenditures under title I of this Act; (8) the amount of funds authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section 102 that were used during the reporting period for administrative expenses or for audits and program reviews pursuant to the authority under sections 101(c)(2) and 103; (9) a description of the expenditures made from any Chief of Mission Fund established pursuant to section 101(c)(5) during the period covered by the report, the purposes for which such expenditures were made, and a list of the recipients of any expenditures from the Chief of Mission Fund in excess of $100,000; (10) an accounting of assistance provided to Pakistan under title I of this Act, broken down into the categories set forth in section 301(a)(6); (11) an evaluation of efforts undertaken by the Government of Pakistan to (A) disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al Qaeda, the Taliban, and other extremist and terrorist groups in the FATA and settled areas; (B) eliminate the safe havens of such forces in Pakistan; (C) close terrorist camps, including those of Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed; (D) cease all support for extremist and terrorist groups; (E) prevent attacks into neighbouring countries; (F) increase oversight over curriculum in Madrassas, including closing Madrassas with direct links to the Taliban or other extremist and terrorist groups; and (G) improve counterterrorism financing and anti-money laundering laws, apply for observer status for the Financial Action Task Force, and take steps to adhere to the United Nations International Convention for the Suppression of Financing of Terrorism; (12) a detailed description of Pakistan’s efforts to prevent proliferation of nuclear-related material and expertise; (13) an assessment of whether assistance provided to Pakistan has directly or indirectly aided the expansion of Pakistan’s nuclear weapons program, whether by the diversion of United States assistance or the reallocation of Pakistan’s financial resources that would otherwise be spent for programs and activities unrelated to its nuclear weapons program; (14) a detailed description of the extent to which funds obligated and expended pursuant to section 202(b) meet the requirements of such section; and (15) an assessment of the extent to which the Government of Pakistan exercises effective civilian control of the military, including a description of the extent to which civilian executive leaders and parliament exercise oversight and approval of military budgets, the chain of command, the process of promotion for senior military leaders, civilian involvement in strategic guidance and planning, and military involvement in civil administration.

(b) Government Accountability Office Reports:

(1) PAKISTAN ASSISTANCE STRATEGY REPORT: Not later than one year after the submission of the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report pursuant to section 301(a), the Comptroller General of the United States shall submit to the appropriate congressional committees a report that contains (A) a review of, and comments addressing, the Pakistan Assistance Strategy Report; (B) recommendations relating to any additional actions the Comptroller General believes could help improve the efficiency and effectiveness of United States efforts to meet the objectives of this Act; (C) a detailed description of the expenditures made by Pakistan pursuant to grant assistance under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act (22 USC.

Know Your History!

Sufi Muhammad, born in Dir, is the founder of Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), a Pakistani militant organisation with Deobandi learnings (declared a terrorist outfit and banned in 2002) vying for implementation of Sharia in Pakistan. It operates mainly in the Dir, Swat, and Malakand districts of North-West Frontier Province. Sufi Muhammad was jailed for sending thousands of volunteers to Afghanistan to fight the U.S.-led invasion in 2001. However, he was freed in 2008 after he renounced violence. He is the father-in-law of Maulana Fazlullah, who assumed the leadership of TNSM during Muhammad's imprisonment.

Background

During the 1980s Sufi Muhammad actively participated in Jamaat-e-Islami, an islamist political movement. In 1992 he split from the group to form TNSM.

After the Taliban was ousted from power in Afghanistan in 2001, he organized thousands of militants to fight the Northern Alliance. When Muhammad returned to Pakistan, he was arrested.

Sufi Muhammad remained in prison until 2008 when he agreed in talks with the chief minister of the NWFP to use his influence to work towards peace in the region.

Interview with Sufi Muhammad

Here is the interview published in Daily Times

You said in a 2005 interview with us that what Al Qaeda and the Taliban are doing in Pakistan is haram. Are Fazlullah’s activities over the last sixteen months also haram?
Sufi Muhammad: Yes, I said that about Al Qaeda, but not about the Taliban. Let me say…that debate on past happenings is disallowed in Islam. A hadith sharif says, what has happened in the past should not be discussed.

But how can we proceed without debating the past?
The hadith sharif says a Muslim should not discuss past happenings because he may not remember all the [details] and, therefore, he may…sin by not speaking the truth.

A majority of Swat residents do not think the peace deal recently signed between the TNSM and the NWFP government will last long.
God Almighty does everything; he builds and destroys countries.

Residents also doubt whether peace is possible in the presence of armed Taliban.
Everyone keeps weapons. People in Peshawar have weapons with them.

You support keeping weapons?
Yes, you can keep weapons with you.

Did you ask Fazlullah to surrender weapons after the sharia law deal?
Keeping weapons is halal in Islam.

President Zardari said recently that force would be used if the Taliban do not surrender weapons in Swat.
His statement is childish…immature.

With sharia law in Swat, there will be a complete ban on music and girls’ education, and people will be forced to grow beards?
There are five subjects — judiciary, politics, economics, education and the executive. The judicial subject will be with us, the rest is beyond our control.

The Taliban are kidnapping government officials and killing soldiers, yet you still hold the army responsible for ceasefire violations.
Kidnapping cases are taking place all over the world. The military violated the ceasefire.

The military says some of its soldiers were shot dead while bringing water.
No. This is not the case. The soldiers were not killed near any stream.

Are soldiers moving freely in Swat after the peace deal?
No. The military cannot move freely unless peace is restored.

After peace is restored, will the army leave Swat?
This is Pakistan’s army and Swat is within Pakistan’s borders. I will have no objection if a military cantonment is established here.

Locals say innocent people have been killed. Will the aggrieved families be able to get justice?
I have told you already: we will not discuss what has happened in the past. Sharia law does not allow this.

If a court summons a key Taliban commander, will he appear before the court?
If Caliph Umar (RA) can appear before a court, then why can’t others?

So Fazlullah will also appear in court if summoned?
If he does not… he will be acting against the sharia law.

What you did in Malakand in the 1990s and then in Afghanistan in 2001 you called ‘jihad’. Are Fazlullah’s activities over the last 16 months in Swat also jihad?
I do not want to speak on this.

What are Fazlullah’s plans after the peace deal?
He will support imposition of sharia law.

You have termed democracy ‘infidelity’. But Maulana Sami-ul Haq, Maulana Fazlur Rehman and Qazi Hussain Ahmad are taking part in the democratic process.
Democracy is not permissible in sharia law. I will not name [these leaders] but they are taking part in infidelity. I will not offer prayers if one of [these leaders] is leading those prayers.

Do you intend to export sharia law to other parts of Pakistan?
If people help me, I will. Otherwise, no.

Sharia in Swat -- problem or solution?

By Ikram Sehgal
Months of intense pressure by the Pakistan Army on Maulana Fazlullah resulted in considerable collateral damage to his organization but also dislocation of thousands of local population and loss of precious lives of both civilians and Pakistani soldiers. A peace agreement devised by Sufi Mohammad, leader of the Tehrik-e-Nifaz-e-Shariat Mohammadi (TNSM), has the backing of the NWFP government as well as tacit sanction of the federal government.

There is bound to be mixed opinion about any agreement with terrorists of the Fazlullah-kind, the misperceptions force-multiplied by the confusion prevailing. The government did a terrible job of preparing the people of Pakistan for the proposed deal, more importantly the world was left mostly aghast. With the PPP trying to project a secular image in the world, the Presidency has been sensitive to growing western criticism by talking about the implementing of the Sharia at some future point "when complete peace has been restored in Swat". NATO expressed its reservations and after some hesitation (and in line with US Special Envoy for Pakistan and Afghanistan Richard Holbrooke) US Defence Secretary Robert Gates joined the chorus of critical voices. Unsurprisingly India, in firm self-denial about the roots and causes of terrorism of the non-Muslim kind within its own territory, is predicting dire consequences for the world. Engaged heavily in stoking the Swat cauldron, one can understand their motivated interest in protecting their "investment" in Fazlullah.

Hit hardest by the ongoing fighting, the people of Swat have welcomed the ceasefire. Observers and analysts who know the area, its history and its people closely have also welcomed the prospects of lasting peace. Experience of the ongoing "war against terrorism" in Afghanistan and in FATA should have brought home the truth that though their motivation may look alike from the distance and even though the ideology they profess may have common features and certainly linkages operationally, Al Qaeda and Taliban are quite different as organizations. Al Qaeda may be destroyed and defeated militarily but the Taliban cannot be defeated militarily or eliminated physically because it has become a mindset, an ideology prevalent in large parts of the tribal population of Pakistan. Many complex reasons prevent this situation being eliminated in a short time. Moreover Fazlullah needed to be isolated from the mainstream, Maulana Sufi Mohammad does that effectively.

Fazlullah has instructed his following not to display arms in public, it would have reinforced his rhetoric about being "the victor". This public perception is contrary to facts; the Pakistan Army has understandable reservations because ceasefires in the past have been used to regroup and re-fit. Previous peace agreements also collapsed because viz (1) the government backed out from some of its commitments and (2) far from having a unified command separate entities among the Taliban have been acting independently against any peace arrangement. Trust, which is a precondition for smooth working, is badly lacking. There is apprehension that implementation of the Sharia would undermine the judicial system of Pakistan; that is not true. Provisions in our Constitution include the 'Objectives Resolution' providing for the implementation of Islamic laws in this country. The far bigger problem is to define what exactly is the Sharia; determining that will be a complex task for the Qazis and their courts.

The demand for implementation of the Sharia in Swat is nothing new; this longstanding demand has some justification. Swat is a former so-called 'Princely State', a territory being ruled indirectly in British times through a local ruler, the Wali of Swat on behalf of the British, but under indigenous laws. The status of Swat was kept intact at the time of independence, never being formally incorporated into Pakistan administratively, politically or legally. Formal merger with Pakistan took place as late as 1969. The legal system under which the Wali was providing justice was a combination of Islamic injunctions and tribal customs or interpretations of those injunctions. Qazi courts provided quick and cheap justice with the Wali himself being the final legal authority.

This legal system was maintained during the initial years after the merger till the 1973 Constitution made Swat a part of the Provincially Administrated Tribal Areas (PATA) directly under the control of the President of Pakistan as represented by the Governor of NWFP. The traditional legal set-up was still not touched. Things became difficult only after 1975 when the Governor introduced a regulation giving legal powers to the Deputy Commissioner (DC) of Swat District. The two parallel legal systems created procedural confusion and delays in the dispensation of justice. As rightly stated by Amber Darr in his article, giving the DC legal powers in addition to his executive functions was a violation of the principle of separation between executive and judiciary. This situation created inconvenience and frustration, and led to dissatisfaction among the people in Swat. A legal judgment by the Superior Courts against this unsatisfactory situation in PATA came too late.

In 1994 the TSNM under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad succeeded in their fight for the implementation of the Sharia or – as we have seen- for the return to the status quo of 1969, the Nizam-e-Adl was proclaimed. The demand had been granted by the PPP-government in 1994 after fruitless efforts for nearly 25 years to suppress the movement. Though successive governments tried to implement the agreement of 1994 the situation was less than satisfactory. The events of 9/11 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the US in November 2001 created a wave of anger among the Pakistani Pashtuns. Sufi Mohammad, whose movement till then had not been militant, led a group of several thousand followers to Afghanistan to join the fight in support of his fellow Pashtuns. The campaign ended in a disaster with most of the Swatis killed or captured. Rashid Dostum buried many of them alive in Shebergan after the Pakistanis were handed over by Maulana Dadullah to Dostum in exchange for allowing the Afghan elements in his Taliban force surrounded in Konduz to go free. On his return Sufi Mohammad was tried and put into jail. Fearful of the parents of the youth lost in Afghanistan, he elected to remain in jail for his own safety. Militancy then surfaced next in Swat under the leadership of Sufi Mohammad's son-in-law Fazlullah or 'Maulana Radio'; by 2006 or early 2007 it had become quite virulent. The war in Afghanistan led towards a radicalization of the Sufi's movement and Fazlullah capitalized on Sufi Mohammad's absence.

Those who talk about the "barbarians being 100 miles from the gates of Islamabad" must understand that the peace deal towards the implementation of the Sharia is simply the concession of a demand already conceded earlier. The local Swati population, mostly Yusufzai Pashtuns, need peace and harmony in their lives. We must give the Sufi Mohammad initiative a good try, keeping the military option always open and not letting Fazlullah call the shots. While many hurdles remain, that the people of Swat want to give the deal a chance should be enough reason to go for it.

A Nation

For we are far from where we started, but only to find we never moved, and the world left us behind. Yes my countrymen, this is the era of our test, all that has passed, has passed, all that we have done, we have done, so we stand where we stand today with the knowledge of all that have passed before us. Never will this time come again; never will this opportunity come again for this may be the last, last of the many which in ignorance we have missed. This is indeed the point of no return, last flame of hope which may die with the next whirlwind. Rising up to bring change is all but left, overcoming every obstacle is all important, to strengthening our country is our duty. Moving forward is the only option for every other road is already travelled, every other word already used but one, WE are the reason for our country’s condition today, WE are who made our country and social culture this way, for it is us who make this country and not them, the ones we blame. The rule of the scavengers is only possible when there are no lions around. A thief is not scared of a sleeping guard, my countrymen we are the lions and we are the guards. We are the sole reason people gave their lives to ensure the future of, we are the hope for the country they sacrificed everything for. To ignore that is unpatriotic, to forget that is treacherous. For long, we have taken for granted the word Pakistani; it is time we stop symbolizing the WORD and start symbolizing ourselves. We should not be recognized by our Country, but our Country should be recognized by us. For this is how you are perceived, you represent your country and each of you is the President, Prime Minister, Chief Justice and Ambassador of Pakistan. Your every step, your every move should be of excellence and perfection because you are not just a person but you are a nation.

Righteous Causes and Liberating Movements

In today's day and age, I often wonder about the existence of the people centuries ago, existence only read in books, about the wonders of their quests and absolution. To be in that era of the timeline of human history surely seems fascinating and exhilarating. So much honour, discipline and integrity in a person’s soul are now just talk of legends. What once was a quality is a weakness today, there are many who would not agree but it is a fact that politeness is considered cowardice, courtesy is considered inferiority, modesty is considered arrogance and silence is considered a loss. If you agree to this then read on, otherwise close this and go on with your daily lives and be lead around like a mindless sheep. We as a nation are very young, our forefathers wanted the impossible and God’s willing they achieved it, in doing so they handed us this country for our future. But we have wandered around like a cow, following the mirages of grassy greens from field to field, but yet to come across a genuine vision. I wish sometimes I was born in year 1910, so at least I would have been surrounded by men and women with just cause in their hearts and truthful conscious in their actions. May be lead by leaders with visions to liberate us and safeguard our future and our children’s future. Those were the ideals to struggle for and may be have the honour of dying for as well. I know in every Pakistanis heart the same dream stays alive to be a part of that era to shape the world around us and to make the world as we see it and the way it is right for all. Sixty years have past, but the fight still remains, we are facing problems of the same nature. Our society has become a class system with Wealth being the classification unit and everything else revolves around that system, from law and order to politics of the highest level. Now I might be wrong in a lot of eyes but if you replace the unit with Religion what do you get? For those who grasped my point will immediately understand what I mean. Yes my friends we had set out to make our utopia and ended up right where it all started. We have been undone by our own and ourselves, we have forgotten the true meaning of being a Pakistani, it is not just a word to symbolize a citizen of Pakistan. But it means I am the descendant of the legends that changed the shape of the world to make it right, make it better, make this soil our home, and our inability to mould this country into an image of their vision is to spit in their faces and call them fools for laying down their lives for something we have forgotten so easily. There is no roadmap to right all the wrongs; it may take sixty more years or even a hundred years to accomplish our goals but it lies with us to accomplish this mission. So I beg of you to grab the opportunities in life to make a difference, hold on to the qualities that make an honourable man, teach yourself and your children the true meaning of being a Pakistani. The day you realize this yourself, like I have, than that day is the beginning for your righteous causes and liberating movements.

Problems, Problems and Problems

Problems, Problems, Problems, where ever you look there are problems jumping right in your face. The logical thought which creeps into a sane person's mind is, what is the solution, how do we resolve this issue and make things better again. Now put the same scenario in front of a Pakistani, what is the logical thought that will come into this person's mind?, "How does it affect me?" if it does, "how do I get out of it?" and if it doesn't, "How do I avoid it?". This is the product of the 61 year history of Pakistan; I cannot summarize the history any better than that. Whether we have progressed or not does not matter, what has been accomplished is the mindset of a person has been manipulated and what once was an active role has gone into passive role, with the only responsibility which they feel is mandatory, is the review of the current affairs and circulation of gossip and rumours.

There are some people who call up TV Shows hosting our "wannabe" leaders and pour their heart out, making their complaints and what not. Upon doing this they feel relieved that they did something about the country's problems, when in fact all they did is satisfy themselves in hopes of proving themselves as patriot. The way would be to find a solution for the problems, if the government cannot do it, then we must do it ourselves. Its just not the government's country its ours as well, so why cant we work to make it better? Our responsibilities do not end at giving taxes and votes, they go beyond the government responsibilities. There is a reason it has been said that the people define the country and not the other way around.

This is not to inspire any one to do something different and try and justify themselves and their actions, this is what I believe to be true and what I felt and realized over the years.

What we need right now is not a messenger reminding us of the problems we face as a country. What we need is a patriot who stands up for what he believes in, who is tired of watching from the sidelines, a person who wants change, a person who wants to be the change, a person who believes everything that happens in Pakistan affects him, and he cannot and will not avoid it